Fourth Amended Complaint — Disability Discrimination and Retaliation Against LA Metro

Venue

Venue is proper in this Court because the plaintiff and defendants are residents and/or do business in the County of Los Angeles, and all acts alleged took place or are related to the County of Los Angeles.

Charging allegations

1. Plaintiff Michael Grant is a former employee of the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority ("MTA"), a public entity. MTA and Does 1–20 are referred to collectively as "Defendants".

2. MTA is a public entity located in Los Angeles County and operates out of 1 Gateway Plaza, Los Angeles, CA 90012.

3. The true names and capacities of Does 1 through 20 are at this time unknown to plaintiff, who therefore sues said defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will ask leave of Court to amend this complaint to reflect their true names and capacities when the same have been ascertained. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that each of said defendants is responsible, jointly and severally, for the events and injuries described herein.

4. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that at all times mentioned each co-defendant was the predecessor-in-interest, successor-in-interest, agent, counselor, employee, servant, partner, franchisee and/or joint venturer of each of the other co-defendants, and in doing the actions mentioned was acting within the scope of that authority and with the permission and consent of each co-defendant.

5. On information and belief, MTA serves as transportation planner and coordinator, designer, builder and operator for one of the country's largest, most populous counties.

6. On information and belief, MTA has a history of mistreating bus operators who have filed workers' compensation claims. Bus operators who have filed workers' compensation claims are subjected to retaliation in the form of different standards of enforcement of discipline, and are terminated with pretext.

7. Plaintiff had worked for the MTA for 32 years as a bus operator.

8. Plaintiff had a history of disabilities while working for the MTA.

9. Plaintiff had asked for, and had been given, accommodations for these disabilities.

10. Shortly after returning from an FML-protected leave of absence because of disabilities, and shortly after his accommodations for the disabilities were granted, Plaintiff was fired for a pretextual reason.

11. On information and belief, the real reason Plaintiff was fired was that the MTA was substantially motivated by illegal reasons as set forth below.

Subject matter jurisdiction

12. For the claims requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), Gov't Code §§ 12900–12996 et seq., plaintiff has exhausted such remedies. Plaintiff received a Right-to-Sue Letter from the DFEH dated July 8, 2014, attached to the complaint as Exhibit A.

13. Defendants were served with copies of the charge via certified mail.

14. Claims against government entities under FEHA are exempt from the filing requirements of the Government Claims Act. Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal. App. 3d 861 (1983).

15. Gov. Code § 945.4 provides that no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action of this kind until a written claim has been presented to the public entity and acted upon by the board.

16. For all claims not exempt from the Government Claims Act, Plaintiff filed a claim for damages with the MTA on June 9 in the manner required by Gov. Code § 911.2, and such claims were denied on July 7, 2014.

17. Plaintiff therefore meets the statutory requirements of § 945.4 and may bring a claim against MTA and Does 1–20 for money or damages in this jurisdiction. Ovando v. City of Los Angeles, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (2000).

First cause of action — disability discrimination (Gov. Code § 12940(m))

18. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each allegation contained in each aforementioned paragraph as though fully set forth herein.

19. The laws of the State of California, as declared by its constitution and statutory schemes, prohibit employment discrimination and harassment because of disability.

20. During Plaintiff's employment with Defendants, Plaintiff was diagnosed with various disabilities and had a history of disabilities as that term is defined under FEHA, including injuries that resulted from work after 32 years on the job.

21. Among other disabilities, Plaintiff was involved in a car accident and sustained injuries to his low back, neck and bilateral wrists that prevented him from doing his essential job duties without a reasonable accommodation.

22. Plaintiff provided documentation to Defendants by providing them with doctor's notes and workers' compensation reports stating the same.

23. The history of disabilities meant that at all times pertinent Plaintiff's ability to engage in certain major physical, mental and social activities, as well as his ability to work if left untreated or unmedicated, might become affected.

24. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendants, through their employees, managers and supervisors, knew that Plaintiff suffered from a history of disabilities that limited major life activities.

25. On information and belief, Plaintiff's history of disability was a motivating factor in the decision to discharge him, because Defendants' allegation that he was discharged for gross misconduct is a pretext, and Defendants treated Plaintiff differently than employees who were not disabled.

26. On information and belief, MTA had not terminated employees who did not have a history of disabilities and who engaged in conduct similar to what Defendants allege was the reason for Plaintiff's termination, and therefore treated Plaintiff differently because of his history of disabilities.

27. Plaintiff alleges that at all times pertinent he was a good employee who performed his work duties in a conscientious and professional manner. Defendants had no good cause or justification to discipline Plaintiff or terminate his employment, and his termination was motivated by and was the result of unlawful discrimination because of his history of disabilities.

28. Defendants were aware, or should have been aware, of the conduct alleged. Notwithstanding their actual and/or constructive knowledge, Defendants failed to take appropriate remedial action to correct such acts or to prevent them from occurring again. Instead, Defendants' failure to act fostered and extended the discrimination.

29. As a result of Defendants' unlawful conduct, Plaintiff has suffered loss of income, intangible employment opportunities, loss of reputation, and other employment-related harms in an amount to be proven at trial.

30. As a further direct and proximate result, Plaintiff has suffered extreme and severe mental anguish, humiliation, emotional distress, nervousness, tension, anxiety and depression, resulting in damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

31. Pursuant to Government Code § 12965(b), Plaintiff requests an award of attorney fees against Defendants.

Second cause of action — retaliation for taking medical leave (Gov. Code § 12945.2(l))

32. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each allegation contained in each aforementioned paragraph, except as to paragraphs where certain damages are not available.

33. Gov. Code § 12945.2(l) prevents retaliation against an individual's exercise of the right to family care and medical leave.

34. Plaintiff took multiple medical leaves of absence pursuant to Gov. Code § 12945(a).

35. No more than a month after returning to work from a medical leave, Plaintiff was spat on by an angry passenger.

36. Plaintiff protected himself from further assault from this passenger.

37. MTA fabricated a story that Plaintiff was engaged in gross misconduct, when in fact Plaintiff was only defending himself from a belligerent passenger and acting with complete restraint given the circumstances.

38. The reasons given by Defendants for Plaintiff's termination are false, because under Defendants' own rules it is not gross misconduct for Plaintiff to defend himself from a belligerent passenger. Plaintiff was fired for pretextual reasons.

39. Defendants knew that Plaintiff did not engage in gross misconduct, but instead fired him in retaliation for exercising his right to a medical leave of absence as provided by FML and CFRA.

40. Defendants were aware, or should have been aware, of the conduct alleged, and failed to take appropriate remedial action to correct such acts or to prevent them from occurring again.

41. As a result of Defendants' unlawful conduct, Plaintiff has suffered loss of income in an amount to be proven at trial.

42. As a further direct and proximate result, Plaintiff has suffered extreme and severe mental anguish, humiliation, emotional distress, nervousness, tension, anxiety and depression, resulting in damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

43. Pursuant to Government Code § 12965(b), Plaintiff requests an award of attorney fees against Defendants.

Third cause of action — retaliation for requesting an accommodation (Gov. Code § 12940(h))

44. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each allegation contained in each aforementioned paragraph, except as to paragraphs where certain damages are not available.

45. Gov. Code § 12940(h) prevents retaliation against an employee who requests an accommodation, whether or not he or she received one.

46. Plaintiff was given multiple medical leaves of absence as an accommodation for his medical condition.

47. No more than a month after returning to work from a medical leave, Plaintiff was spat on by an angry passenger.

48. Plaintiff protected himself from further assault from this passenger.

49. MTA fabricated a story that Plaintiff was engaged in gross misconduct, when in fact Plaintiff was only defending himself from a belligerent passenger and acting with complete restraint given the circumstances.

50. The reasons given by Defendants for Plaintiff's termination are false, because under Defendants' own rules it is not gross misconduct for Plaintiff to defend himself from a belligerent passenger. Plaintiff was fired for pretextual reasons.

51. Defendants knew that Plaintiff did not engage in gross misconduct, but instead fired him in retaliation for exercising his right to an accommodation as provided in Government Code § 12940(h).

52. Defendants were aware, or should have been aware, of the conduct alleged, and failed to take appropriate remedial action to correct such acts or to prevent them from occurring again.

53. As a result of Defendants' unlawful conduct, Plaintiff has suffered loss of income in an amount to be proven at trial.

54. As a further direct and proximate result, Plaintiff has suffered extreme and severe mental anguish, humiliation, emotional distress, nervousness, tension, anxiety and depression, resulting in damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

55. Pursuant to Government Code § 12965(b), Plaintiff requests an award of attorney fees against Defendants.

Prayer for relief

Plaintiff prays for relief against Defendants, jointly and severally, as follows:

• General damages according to proof, on each cause of action for which such damages are available, in an amount exceeding $5,200,000.
• Compensatory damages according to proof on each cause of action for which such damages are available.
• Special damages according to proof on each cause of action for which such damages are available.
• Reasonable attorneys' fees according to proof on each cause of action for which such damages are available.
• Prejudgment and post-judgment interest according to proof on each cause of action for which such damages are available.
• Costs of suit incurred.
• Economic, personal injury and emotional distress damages.
• Such other and further relief as the Court deems proper and just.

Plaintiff demands a trial by jury of all causes of action alleged.